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We move now to outside a German wood. 
Three men are there commanded to dig a hole 
In which the two Jews are ordered to lie down 
And be buried alive by the third who is a Pole. 
Not light from the shrine at Weimar beyond the hill 
Nor light from heaven appeared. But he did refuse. 
A Lüger settled back deeply in its glove. 
He was ordered to change places with the Jews. 
Much causal death had drained away their souls. 
The thick dirt mounted towards the quivering chin. 
When only the head was exposed the order came 
To dig him out again and to get back in. 
No light, no light in the blue Polish eye. 
When he finished a riding boot packed down the earth. 
The Lüger hovered lightly in its glove. 
He was shot in the belly and in three hours bled to death. 
Anthony Hecht, ‘More Light! More Light!’ 
 
A ‘false novel’ or a ‘false testimony’? 
Published in September 2009 as part of Gallimard’s prestigious L’Infini series, Jan Karski 
narrates the life of Jan Romuald Kozielewski (Karski’s real name), a key figure of the Polish 
Resistance who during World War II acted as one of the couriers ensuring communication 
between the Underground and the Polish government in exile, residing first in Paris and then, 
after the Germans invaded France, in London. Yet, rather than for his perilous missions, one 
of which ended in Karski’s capture by the Gestapo, the Polish courier is best known for his 
efforts to persuade the Western Allies to act upon the extermination of the Jews carried out by 
the Nazis in German-occupied Poland. Indeed, Haenel’s key objective is to pay tribute1 to ‘the 
man who tried to stop the Holocaust’,2 an ambition confirmed by the fact that all the three 
parts making up this self-consciously hybrid text speak of Karski’s clandestine visits to the 
Warsaw Ghetto and the transit camp of Izbica Lubelska. Otherwise the book’s three parts, 
which greatly vary in length and texture, focus on different stages of Karski’s life and career. 
Part I offers an ekphratic description of the Polish courier’s testimony in Claude Lanzmann’s 
documentary Shoah (1985) in which he recounts his meeting with two Jewish leaders who 
entrusted him with the task of communicating the Jews’ tragedy to the world, and his 
                                                
1 ‘Entretien avec Yannick Haenel: Précisions sur Jan Karski’, Mémoires occupées: Fictions françaises 
et Seconde Guerre mondiale, ed. by Marc Dambre (Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2013), 233-47 
(p. 235). 
2 This is how Karski has often been referred to since the publication of E. Thomas Wood’s and 
Stanisław M. Jankowski’s authorised biography, Karski: How One Man Who Tried to Stop the 
Holocaust (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994).  
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traumatic visits to the ghetto and the camp he infiltrated on their recommendation. Part II then 
summarizes the Polish courier’s own memoirs, Story of the Secret State (1944), which relate 
Karski’s work for the Polish resistance and his diplomatic missions to London and 
Washington. Much longer than Parts I and II and strikingly different in tone, Part III 
concentrates on the Polish hero’s postwar life in America and is narrated by an imaginary Jan 
Karski who is speaking to us from beyond the grave. As if trying to forestall any 
misunderstandings or criticism provoked by this daring mix of fact and fiction, in the author’s 
note Haenel scrupulously distinguishes between the first two parts, which are documentary, 
and Part III that is fictional.3 
It seems that by staging a highly positive hero, whose commitment to the Jewish cause 
has been officially acknowledged by both Israel and America, 4 and by displaying a truly 
reverential attitude towards his courageous and righteous protagonist, Haenel should have 
been spared the sort of criticism that Jonathan Littell faced on publishing Les Bienveillantes 
four years earlier. Indeed, having been awarded two important French literary prizes,5 Jan 
Karski became an overnight critical and commercial success, and earned its hitherto relatively 
unknown author many honours.6 In this context, the accusations that Claude Lanzmann 
levelled at Haenel in January 2010 came as a surprise; the author of Shoah criticised the 
novelist for having plagiarised his documentary and, worse still, for having written a ‘false 
novel’ and falsified history, as well as for lacking imagination and talent. Lanzmann also 
claimed that Haenel had misrepresented Karski by showing him in a simplistic way as a 
‘pleurnichard et véhément procureur qui met le monde entier en accusation pour n’avoir pas 
sauvé les Juifs’.7 Around the same time, prominent Holocaust historian, Annette Wieviorka, 
launched her crusade against Haenel’s book, calling it a ‘false testimony’ and thus implicitly 
equating it with Jerzy Kosiński’s or Binjamin Wilkomirski’s faked accounts of their 
                                                
3 In interviews Haenel redefined the third past as ‘fiction intuitive’ and highlighted the fictionality of 
Parts I and II. This is because these offer a subjective representation of the documentary texts that in 
themselves are partial in both senses of the word. See ‘Entretien avec Yannick Haenel’, 237. 
4 In 1982, Yad Vashem recognised Karski as Righteous Among the Nations, in 1994 he was made an 
honorary citizen of Israel, and in 2012 Barack Obama awarded Karski the Presidential Medal for 
Freedom. 
5 The Prix Interallié and Prix du roman FNAC. 
6 Haenel was made Chevalier de l’Ordre des Arts et des Lettres and received the Order of Merit of the 
Republic of Poland. 
7 Claude Lanzmann, ‘Jan Karski de Yannick Haenel: un faux roman’, Les Temps modernes 657 
(January-March 2010), online. 
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childhood survival of the Holocaust. 8  Wieviorka also condemned the anachronism of 
Haenel’s conception of World War II politics consisting in the book’s resolute anti-American 
stance. Finally, she took exception to Haenel’s alleged relativisation of Polish anti-Semitism 
and, agreeing with Lanzmann, reproached him for having taken inadmissible liberties with 
historical truth, which the novelist reportedly replaced with ‘un certain nombre de ‘vérités’ 
qui sont les siennes dans une totale désinvolture à l’égard de l’histoire’.9 It is noteworthy that 
the afore-cited accusations were quickly taken up and repeated in Karski’s homeland, a fact 
that seems puzzling given Haenel’s adulatory attitude towards the Polish hero and his 
romanticised image of Poland itself.10 The debate then moved from the pages of newspapers 
and magazines to scholarly journals where, once again, Haenel found his supporters and 
detractors. 11  
Rather than trying to re-evaluate the novel’s historical veracity or further discuss the 
ethics of its marriage of fact and fiction but nevertheless polemicising with certain points of 
                                                
8 Published in 1965 as an autobiographical novel, Kosinski’s The Painted Bird was later denounced as 
fiction. See Eliot Weinberger, Karmic Traces 1993–1995 (New York: New Directions, 2000), 56. 
Likewise, Wilkomirski’s Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood were exposed as a fake and 
its author as an impostor. See, for example, Andrea Reiter, ‘Memory and Authenticity: The Case of 
Binjamin Wilkomirski’, The Memory of Catastrophe, ed. by Peter Grey and Kendrick Oliver 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 132-45. 
9 Annette Wieviorka, ‘Karski témoigne: La réponse d’Annette Wieviorka’, L’Histoire 379 (March 
2014), online. For more details on the acrimonious exchanges between Haenel and his critics, see 
Richard J. Golsan, ‘L’“Affaire Jan Karski”: Réflexions sur un scandale littéraire et historique’, 
Mémoires occupées, pp. 183-90. 
10 Among the critics who reacted to Jan Karski were the journalist Leopold Unger, the President of the 
Jan Karski Society, Kazimierz Pawełek, and a score of prominent journalists such as Aleksandra Klich 
or Jarosław Kurski. See, for example, Leopold Unger, ‘On ne touche pas à Jan Karski’, Courrier 
international, 15.02.2010, online; Aleksandra Klich, ‘Ksero z życia Karskiego’ [‘A Photocopy of 
Karski’s Life’], Gazeta Wyborcza, 28.09.2010, online; Jarosław Kurski, ‘Karykatury Jana Karskiego’ 
[‘Caricatures of Jan Karski’], Gazeta Wyborcza, 22.03.2010, online; Kazimierz Pawełek, ‘Karski n’a 
jamais soupçonné les États-Unis de trahison’, Le Point, 04.02.2010.  
11 Among Haenel’s most severe critics is Golsan who has endorsed Lanzmann’s and Wieviorka’s 
judgment of the novel, adding further arguments against Haenel’s writing. He described Jan Karski as 
a novel where ‘distortion bleeds into scandalous revisionism’ and its protagonist as ‘a problematic and 
dubious witness’, as well as ‘a falsifier of history’. See Richard J. Golsan, ‘The Poetics and Perils of 
Faction: Contemporary French Fiction and the Memory of World War II’, The Romanic Review 105.1-
2 (2014), 53–68 (p. 63 and p. 65). More positive have been Philippe Carrard, Manuel Braganca, Pavel 
Hladki, and Evelyne Ledoux-Beaugrand. See Philippe Carrard, ‘Historiographic Metafiction, French 
Style’, Style 48.2 (Summer 2014), 181-202, Manuel Braganca, ‘Faire parler les morts: Sur Jan Karski 
et la controverse Lanzmann-Haenel’, Modern and Contemporary France 23.1 (2015), 35-46, Pawel 
Hladki, ‘“Qui témoigne pour le témoin?” Question de la liberté littéraire à l’exemple de Jan Karski de 
Yannick Haenel’, Études romanes de Brno 33.1 (2012), 57-67, Evelyne Ledoux-Beaugrand, ‘Les 
restes d’Auschwitz: Intertextualité et postmémoire dans Jan Karski de Yannick Haenel et C’est 
maintenant du passé de Marianne Rubinstein’, Études françaises 49.2 (2013), 14562, and ‘Emprunt et 
bricolage: Traces mémorielles de la Shoah dans Drancy Avenir et Jan Karski’, French Forum 39.1 
(Winter 2014), 143-57. 
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Lanzmann’s corrosive discourse, the present article considers Haenel’s tribute to Jan Karski 
as an act of meta-witnessing, a term used by Jacques Derrida in reference to Paul Celan’s 
poetry or perhaps even to his own readings of the Romanian poet’s work.12 By meta-
witnessing — as opposed to secondary witnessing — I understand the act of testifying on 
behalf of a witness which, analogically to metafiction, is underpinned by a self-reflective 
meditation upon the mutually contradictory necessity and impossibility of bearing witness 
(for a witness). In preparation for my examination of the moral implications of Haenel’s 
unorthodox take on World War II history, I will contextualise Jan Karski with the 
development of Holocaust memory in the face of the advent of second- and, more recently, 
third-generation survivors, as well as of the so-called ‘non-witnesses’ or ‘non-survivors’ who, 
though lacking a personal link to the Shoah, feel compelled to speak about it. Using, among 
others, Marianne Hirsch’s taxonomy of postmemory, I will define Jan Karski’s position in 
relation to existing Holocaust testimony, before discussing its author’s both intense self-
awareness of the morally risky nature of his project and ambition to offer a more general 
reflection upon the figure of the witness and the act of secondary witnessing. Guided by Jan 
Karski’s epigraph — ‘Qui témoigne pour le témoin?’ —, which paraphrases the closing 
stanza of Celan’s poem ‘Aschenglorie’, my analysis will then turn to the way Haenel 
addresses the aporia voiced by the poem and consisting in the moral obligation and 
psychological urge to testify to what is often felt to be unrepresentable for the absence of the 
‘real’ witnesses. Finally, framing my discussion with Dan Stone’s and Annette Wieviorka’s 
considerations upon the tension between Holocaust testimony and historiography, I will read 
Jan Karski not only as a questioning of the future of Holocaust memory in the post-witness 
era but also as an apology of testimony, even as invented by a novelist. This is because, unlike 
history proper, testimony is capable of voicing feelings and especially trauma, and can 
therefore showcase what Jean-François Lyotard has termed a ‘differend’, thus performing 
what the French philosopher considers the postmodern writer’s duty. I will thus conclude with 
an attempt to assess whether, as many believe, Haenel’s portrayal of Karski is doing further 
violence to the memory of the Polish hero and the cause he championed, or, conversely, it is 
an ethically sound testimony to the wrongs suffered by the Jews and their advocate, which 
Haenel achieves precisely by finding a new idiom for the expression of their differend. 
                                                
12 Jacques Derrida, ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’, Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of 
Paul Celan, ed. by Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 
pp. 65-96 (p. 70). 
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Speak, postmemory 
Since the emergence of the second generation of Holocaust survivors we have become 
accustomed not only to the idea of secondary witnessing but also to that of meta-witnessing, 
with children of Holocaust survivors narrating their parents’ wartime ordeal. Among the 
numerous examples is Art Spiegelman’s autobiographical graphic novel which, exhibiting 
postmodern narrative techniques, metatextually reflects upon the process of gathering, 
processing and transmitting the father’s testimony by his son. Maus additionally explores the 
inheritance by the second generation of the so-called ‘Survivor Syndrome’, illustrating the 
phenomenon consisting in the victims’ children suffering from their parents’ wartime 
brutalisation.13 Spiegelman’s graphic novel also probes the disturbance in the parent-child 
relationship, which has been observed by psychologists working with the survivors’ 
children.14 Spiegelman’s account thus becomes ‘a paradigmatic and generative text’ for 
Hirsch’s discussion of ‘postmemory’,15 a neologism she coined to describe the second 
generation’s profound internalisation of, not to say identification with their parents’ traumatic 
experiences. And, if in Hirsch’s terms, Spiegelman’s meta-witnessing is ‘vertical’, which 
means that memories are passed down from parent to child, ‘horizontal’ transmission of 
Holocaust experience consists in the child’s position becoming more broadly available to 
her/his contemporaries.16 A special example of horizontal postmemory is Marguerite Duras’s 
autobiographical text, La Douleur (1985). Its authorial narrator casts herself as witness to the 
testimony of her husband, Robert L., imprisoned in Buchenwald and Dachau.17 While telling 
the story of someone waiting and then nursing a survivor of the univers concentrationnaire, 
the narrator reflects upon the process of secondary witnessing and the mediated nature of any 
historical evocation.18 She also makes intertextual references to her husband’s own record of 
                                                
13 Ruth Franklin, A Thousand Darknesses: Lies and Truth in Holocaust Fiction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 219. 
14 Franklin, 219. 
15 Marianne Hirsch, ‘Family Pictures: Maus, Mourning and Post-Memory’, Discourse 15.2 (Winter 
1992-1993), 3-29. See also Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and 
Postmemory (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 12 and 25-31. 
16 Marianne Hirsch, ‘The Generation of Postmemory’, Poetics Today 29.1 (Spring 2008), 103-28 (pp. 
114-15). In her typology, Hirsch is indebted to Edward Said’s distinction between vertical filiation and 
horizontal affiliation. See note 9, 114. 
17 Marguerite Duras, La Douleur (Paris: P.O.L., 1985). The collection has been controversial because 
whereas Duras presented La Douleur as a journal she had kept during the war and found in her 
country house only many years later, it remains unclear when the text was actually written.  
18 For an analysis of La Douleur as an example of a Holocaust testimony, see Camila Loew, The 
Memory of Pain: Women’s Testimonies of the Holocaust (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 145-84. 
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his stay in the camps — L’Espèce humaine —, which was published in 1947 but, typically for 
the early Holocaust testimonies, was initially paid only scant attention.19 
Although some of the narratives by second-generation writers sparked polemic, which 
was usually to do with the violation of Holocaust memory through inappropriate form or 
content, or, as exemplified by the Wilkomirski or the Kosinski affairs,20 through lack of 
authenticity, their reception has overwhelmingly reflected Georges Perec’s words that ‘[o]n 
n’attaque pas la littérature concentrationnaire’.21 Moreover, as Ruth Franklin notes, these 
accounts gradually displaced survivors’ testimonies as the children appropriated their parents’ 
memory,22 becoming, in Helen Epstein’s words, ‘possessed by a history they never lived’.23 
What happens, however, when not only the witnesses themselves but also their offspring will 
no longer be in our midst? Of course, Holocaust memories can be passed on to the third 
generation and recent years have indeed seen a proliferation of narratives by the survivors’ 
grandchildren.24 Yet, works on the Nazi genocide have also been published by writers whose 
familial connection to the Holocaust is tenuous or non-existent, and whom Gary Weissman 
would classify as ‘non-witnesses’ or ‘non-survivors’,25 and Geoffrey Hartman as ‘witnesses 
by adoption’.26 
                                                
19 Robert Antelme, L’Espèce humaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1957). For the hostility or at least 
indifference to early Holocaust testimonies, see Tony Kushner, ‘Holocaust testimony, Ethics, and the 
Problem of Representation’, Poetics Today 27.2 (Summer 2006), 275-95 (pp. 276-78). 
20 Another example of a false testimony is Martin Gray’s For Those I Loved (1972). The story takes 
the reader from the Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka, which the author did not experience but which he – 
or rather his ghost writer, Max Gallo, – described to tell the ‘whole’ story of the Holocaust. More 
recently, Deli Strummer, a survivor or several concentration camps, was exposed for killing off her 
survivor husband in her testimony, A Personal Reflection on the Holocaust (1988). See Kushner, 283-
84. 
21 Georges Perec, ‘Robert Antelme ou la vérité de la literature’, L. G. Une aventure des années 
soixante (Paris: Seuil, 1992), pp. 87-114 (p. 87). 
22 Franklin, 221. 
23 Cited by Franklin, 223. 
24 See, for example, Ivan Jablonka’s Histoire des grands-parents que je n’ai jamais eus: Une enquête 
(Paris: Seuil, 2012); Marianne Rubinstein, C’est maintenant du passé (Paris: Verticales-Phase deux, 
2009); or Arnaud Rykner, Le Wagon (Paris: Le Rouergue, 2010). For a discussion of the ownership of 
Holocaust memory, see Imre Kertész, ‘Who Owns Auschwitz?’, trans. by John MacKay, The Yale 
Journal of Criticism 14.1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 267-72.   
25 Gary Weissman, Fantasies of Witnessing: Postwar Efforts to Experience the Holocaust (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 20. 
26 Geoffrey Hartman, The Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath of the Holocaust (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press), 6. 
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Among the third-generation French-language authors are Jonathan Littell, Laurent 
Binet, Fabrice Humbert, or Yannick Haenel.27 None of these writers, however, can claim a 
‘familial’ connection to the Holocaust and some of them, like Haenel, are not even Jewish. 
Instead, to borrow Hirsch’s term, these writers’ link to les années noires is ‘affiliative’, that is 
resulting from, on the one hand, the empathy with the actual survivors and their descendants, 
and, on the other, ‘mediation that would be broadly appropriate, available, and indeed 
compelling enough to encompass a larger collective in an organic web of transmission.’28 
Otherwise, Haenel’s knowledge of the Holocaust can be defined as based on ‘national 
postmemory’, as Frédérique Leichter-Flack calls the official commemorations of the Shoah 
that have intensified in France since the 1970s.29 Indeed, although Haenel may be haunted by 
his grandfathers’ contrasting wartime choices, 30  his relationship with the massacre of 
European Jews remains purely textual. Consequently, for Evelyne Ledoux-Beaugrand, Haenel 
is a consumer and producer of ‘Holocaust culture’ (but not a contributor to the Holocaust 
industry!), a term coined by Imre Kertész to designate the moral values that have arisen from 
the extermination of the Jews. These values have nurtured a literature that ‘give[s] rise to 
redemption: the spirit, the catharsis’. 31  For Ledoux-Beaugrand, who sadly somewhat 
simplifies the Hungarian writer’s thought, this means that Heanel’s work feeds off the cultural 
representations of the Nazi genocide which have proliferated since the end of the war and 
which, as exemplified by, among others, Maus, have also influenced the portrayals of the 
Holocaust created by the survivors’ children.32  
The flesh became word and made its dwelling among us 
Rather than being a callous usurper of Karski’s story, as Lanzmann, Wieviorka and others 
would like to see him, Haenel demonstrates his acute sensitivity about his position as a ‘non-
                                                
27 For an analysis of third-generation writers, see Aurélie Barjonet, ‘La Troisième Génération devant 
la Seconde Guerre mondiale: Une situation inédite’, Études romanes de Brno 33.1 (2012), 39-55. 
28 Hirsch, ‘The Generation of Postmemory’, 115. 
29 Frédérique Leichter-Flack, ‘Second Generation, Third Generation, and State Political Postmemory: 
The Holocaust and Its Literary Effects in Contemporary France’, Journal of Literature and Trauma 
Studies 4.1-2 (Spring-Autumn 2015), 67-77 (p. 68). 
30 The writer’s paternal grandfather was first sent to Germany as an S.T.O. and then found himself 
fighting in the Wehrmacht against the Soviets. The maternal grandfather, in contrast, joined the 
Resistance and brought doom onto his family. Yannick Haenel, ‘The Silent Histories’, The Australian, 
19.02.2011, online. 
31 Imre Kertész, ‘The Holocaust as Culture’, trans. by Thomas Cooper, Imre Kertész and Thomas 
Cooper, The Holocaust as Culture (London: Seagull Books, 2011), pp. 57-8 (p. 78). 
32 Hirsch observes that the son can imagine his father’s experience of Auschwitz only by way of the 
widely available photograph of liberated prisoners in Buchenwald. Hirsch, ‘The Generation of 
Postmemory’, 112. 
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witness’. This sensitivity informs, firstly, the book’s very structure which lays bare Haenel’s 
reliance on, on the one hand, documentary evidence, and, on the other, his own imagination in 
the absence of more personal sources of information about Karski and the Holocaust. 
Additionally, when summarising Shoah or Story of the Secret State, Haenel manifestly puts 
himself in the position of a candid viewer/reader whose reception of the texts is subjective 
and may collude with their authors’ intentions. For instance, watching Lanzmann’s interview 
with Karski, Haenel wonders with faked naivety whether, when relaying the two Jews’ 
message, the Polish courier identifies himself with their pleas or deplores the facts that these 
pleas were ignored.33 Similarly, he speculates about Lanzmann’s motives for superposing 
Karski’s monologue over the image of the Statue of Liberty:  
Claude Lanzmann veut-il ainsi saluer la liberté de Jan Karski? Ou, au contraire, en jouant 
sur l’écart entre la voix et l’image, souligner tristement la différence entre l’Europe 
meurtrie dont parle Jan Karski, et le symbole éclatant de la ‘Liberté éclairant le monde’? 
Entre la souffrance des Juifs d’Europe qui s’exprime à travers la voix de Jan Karski, et ce 
que l’Amérique a fait réellement pour sauver les Juifs d’Europe? Impossible de le 
savoir.34  
Haenel’s awareness of the mediatised rather than empirically-based character of his 
knowledge also comes through in his book’s overt intertextuality, which, typically for 
postmodern fiction, symptomatises the view that all writing, be it historical or fictional,35 is 
necessarily interdiscursive. As imagined by Haenel, Karski himself is a textual construct, for 
he is repeatedly identified with — or even reduced to — the message he carries. This means 
that he is either figured as a prophet through whom God speaks or is assimilated with the two 
Jewish leaders. That the fictional Karski is not meant to be the man of flesh and blood whom 
Lanzmann met and believes to know intimately, not to say, to own,36 also transpires from 
Haenel’s amalgamation of his protagonist with other fictional characters, such as the proud, 
solitary and melancholy Polish Rider from Rembrandt’s 1637 painting, Kafka’s Joseph K. or 
Moses, to whom Karski is likened when he seeks refuge in the bulrush basket-like bathtub 
standing in the middle of his hotel room: ‘En remplissant le fond [de la baignoire] avec des 
couvertures et un oreiller, j’avais réussi à me confectionner un abri idéal. […] Cette baignoire 
                                                
33 Yannick Haenel, Jan Karski (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 20-1. 
34 Haenel, Jan Karski, 19. 
35 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (Oxford: Routledge, 1988), 
124-40. 
36 A similar point is made by Ledoux-Beaugrand who states: ‘[Karski] est une présence désincarnée 
constituée d’un amalgame de textes et de représentations, tout à l’image d’un “patchwork” textuel. 
Autrement dit, Jan Karski ne revit sous la plume de Haenel qu’au prix de sa réduction à l’état de texte: 
il devient une fiction, précisément intitule de son nom, où sa parole désormais désincarnée trouve 
momentanément ancrage’ Evelyne Ledoux-Beaugrand, 160. 
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[…] m’importait; c’était une barque, un navire, une nacelle; j’étais conduit vers le récit’.37 
Consequently, rather than depicting Karski a one-dimensional character, as Lanzmann claims, 
Haenel incrusts his hero in the intricate web of intertextual references to Europe’s rich 
cultural tradition and thus captures the complexity of the Polish courier’s both character and 
condition, while highlighting his inexorable fictionality.  
Faced with the conundrum created by the passing of the last eyewitnesses and his 
desire to honour both Karski’s admittedly undervalued efforts and the Jews whose plea the 
Allies never heeded,38 Haenel echoes Arnaud Rykner who, in the prologue to his 2010 novel 
about Convoy no 7909 to Dachau, questions his license to narrate a Holocaust story or to 
combine historical facts with literary invention in doing so.39 More succinct than the author of 
Le Wagon, Haenel conveys his dilemma by using as his novel’s epigraph a paraphrase of the 
closing stanza of Celan’s ‘Aschenglorie’ [‘Ash-glory’], ‘Niemand/ zeugt für den/ Zeugen’ 
[‘No one/ bears witness for the / witness’].40 By rephrasing the poet’s constative or perhaps 
even prohibitive statement as an interrogation, the author probes both the means of preserving 
Holocaust memory in what, alluding to Wieviorka’s expression ‘l’ère du témoin’,41 Ledoux-
Beaugrand has called ‘the post-witness era’,42 and his own legitimacy to substitute for a 
witness. Additionally, with the epigraph and the novel itself, which is indeed devoted to the 
man thought to be the first or at least one of the first to report on the Germans’ crimes against 
Jews, Haenel engages a dialogue with those judging testimonial literature more morally 
suitably to the representation of the Shoah than fiction.43 Paradoxically, however, he also, as I 
will argue later, seems to be challenging the conception of the work of historians, believed 
capable of a neutral and balanced view of the past thanks to their emotional detachment from 
that past, as superior to testimony, which is unavoidably subjective and marked by affect and 
trauma.44 And this is despite, as Dan Stone points out following Giorgio Agamben, that 
‘Hístor is in origin the eyewitness, the one who has seen’.45 
                                                
37 Haenel, Jan Karski, 141. 
38 ‘Entretien avec Yannick Haenel’, 235. 
39 Rykner, 13-14. 
40 In an interview, Haenel talks of his quasi-compulsive urge to write about Karski. ‘Entretien avec 
Yannick Haenel’, 233-34. 
41 Annette Wieviorka, L’Ère du témoin (Paris: Hachette, 2002). 
42 Ledoux-Beaugrand, 145-62, 147. 
43 This position is mentioned by, among others, S. Lillian Kremer in the Introduction to Witness 
through the Imagination (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 13. 
44 For a re-evaluation of testimony as a source of information about the Holocaust, see Dan Stone, 
‘Holocaust Testimony and the Challenge to the Philosophy of History’, History Memory and Mass 
Atrocity: Essays on the Holocaust and Genocide (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006), pp. 132-47. See 
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Haenel’s metafictional inquiry into the act of secondary witnessing persists in the text 
itself whose narrator repeatedly redefines a witness. Is a witness someone who, like Karski, 
has seen the reality to the existence of which he testifies with his very own eyes?46 Or is it 
someone who, like Karski and now Haenel, is willing to speak?47 Or is it the one who refuses 
to forget what he has seen?48 Or, finally, is it the one who has suffered?49 By asking these 
questions Haenel not only ruminates about his own position as a non-Jewish third-generation 
author writing about the Shoah, but also suffuses his metatextual meditation with intertextual 
echoes of canonical texts by Primo Levi, Agamben or Derrida. As for Levi, he exposes the 
tragic unreliability of human memory and, hence, of testimony,50 questions the moral integrity 
of those who did not ‘drown’ but survived most probably through their prevarications.51 
Finally, he goes as far as to undermine the survivors’ right to testify since the real witnesses 
are those who have perished.52 Reading Levi’s work, Agamben, as does Derrida, explores the 
meaning of the term ‘witness’ in various languages. In Latin, for example, there are two 
words: ‘testis’ signifying the person who in a lawsuit is in the position of a third party, and 
‘superstes’ designating the one who has experienced an event and can therefore bear witness 
to it.53 The Greek word for witness is in turn ‘martis’, martyr.54 And, although Agamben 
vehemently contests the idea of martyrdom in relation to Jewish deportees since it would 
justify ‘the scandal of a meaningless death, of an execution that could only appear as 
absurd’,55 he concedes that ‘witnessing’ and ‘martyrdom’ are semantically linked, the Greek 
term deriving from the verb ‘to remember’: ‘The survivor’s vocation is to remember; he 
cannot not remember’.56  
                                                                                                                                                   
also Annette Wieviorka, ‘The Witness in History’, trans. by Jared Stark, Poetics Today 27.2 (Summer 
2006), 385-97 (pp. 95-6). 
45 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, trans. by Liz 
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46 Haenel, Jan Karski, 16. 
47 Haenel, Jan Karski, 16. 
48 Haenel, Jan Karski, 33. 
49 Haenel, Jan Karski, 31. 
50 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. by Raymond Rosenthal (London: Michael Joseph, 
1988), 17-19. 
51 Levi, 62-3. 
52 Levi, 63 
53 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller–
Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 17. 
54 Agamben, 26. 
55 Agamben, 27. 
56 Agamben, 26. Cf. Derrida, 73-6. 
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Illuminated by Levi’s and Agamben’s remarks, Haenel’s protagonist ceases to aspire 
to mimetic accuracy, which, according to Haenel, is in any case impossible to attain. 57 
Instead, he becomes a quintessential and ahistorically construed witness incarnating the 
term’s multiple meanings, encompassing the complexities related to the act of testifying and 
systematically erasing himself behind the message of those who could not be ‘saved’. Indeed, 
like the prisoners described by Agamben, whose will to live is powered by the urge to bear 
witness,58 it is purely through loyalty to those in whose stead he now must speak that Haenel’s 
Karski stays alive despite literally dying of shame when faced with the spectacle of the Jews’ 
brutal deaths.59 Implicitly alluding the Levi’s concept of the ‘grey zone’,60 the protagonist 
probes his own position as a witness and decides that unless one is a victim one cannot avoid 
being on the side of the executioners. This is because ‘[p]ersonne n’échappe à cette abjection 
qui partage les hommes entre ceux qui meurent et ceux qui donnent la mort’61 Consequently, 
what Lanzmann saw as a sign of the uncharacteristic unmanliness of Haenel’s protagonist,62 
can be reconsidered as the witness’s shame of having survived and her/his correlated quasi-
pathological inability to forget, invoked by Agamben and, in Karski’s case, symptomatised by 
insomnia, depression and what Julia Kristeva would call asymbolia.63 By the same token, 
Karski’s accusatory tone, so fiercely condemned by his critics,64 turns the Polish courier into a 
testis who extends the responsibility for the Holocaust to the Allies, accusing them of having 
failed to save the Jews and of then having covered up their crime of non-assistance with the 
Nuremberg trials. Ultimately, Haenel’s Karski is a martis who suffers in the process of 
fulfilling his mission, and who, like Christian martyrs, can certainly serve as an exemplar of 
courage, moral integrity and perseverance.  
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Jan Karski as a ‘a pseudo-testimony’ and ‘the aporia of Auschwitz’  
Returning to the question of meta-witnessing raised by the novel’s epigraph, Haenel 
systematically casts his character as a secondary witness by identifying him with the Jews 
who were being silenced or, to allude to Celan’s poem, reduced to ashes by their German 
oppressors. One could argue that the author thus seeks to establish an analogy between his 
own and the Polish courier’s position as a ‘prosthetic’ or ‘vicarious’ witness 65  who 
empathised with those whose message he carried. Indeed, Karski called himself a ‘Catholic 
Jew’,66 married a Judeo-Polish dancer, Pola Nireńska, whose family was nearly entirely wiped 
out in the Shoah, and become honorary citizen of Israel. Karski’s empathy with the Jews 
affects not only the book’s diegetic but also textual level, through the systematic 
intermingling of Christian and Biblical imagery, as exemplified by the references to Moses or 
the Resurrection. The protagonist’s empathy with the persecuted is also visible in Haenel’s 
description of Karski’s appearance in Lanzmann’s Shoah: 
Il ne s’exprime plus au passé, il révèle le message […]. En parlant il s’anime, sa main 
droite se lève, ses yeux sont baissés, parfois il les ferme, il se concentre. […] [C]e sont 
des paroles qu’il a prononcées mille fois […], et pourtant les voici, prononcées par Jan 
Karski comme elles sont sorties de la bouches des deux hommes au milieu de l’année 
1942, prononcées au présent, directement, comme si c’était eux, les deux hommes qui 
parlaient, et que lui, Jan Karski s’effaçait.67 
The above-quoted passage can be read as a metatextual comment about Haenel’s own 
novelistic enterprise and his desire to disappear behind Karski, as he attempts to do in Parts I 
and II, or indeed to merge with his hero, as he does in Part III where he presents himself as a 
medium through which the dead courier can speak his innermost thoughts.  
However, Haenel’s affinity with his hero has nothing to do with the spooky identity 
theft performed by Wilkomirski who, though a child of a Swiss Protestant women, presented 
— and perhaps also genuinely believed — himself to be a Jewish Holocaust survivor. 
Consequently, rather than a ‘false testimony’, as Wieviorka calls Haenel’s novel, Jan Karski 
can be redefined as a ‘a pseudo-testimony’, which is how, analysing Levi’s and Elie Wiesel’s 
study of the impossibility of bearing witness to the Holocaust, Agamben calls the survivor’s 
accounts.68 To clarify Agamben’s expression and return to Levi’s already-mentioned remark, 
both Levi and Wiesel observe that it is the ‘drowned’ — not the ‘saved’ — who are the true, 
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66 Haenel, Jan Karski, 176. 
67 Haenel, Jan Karski, 17-18. 
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the integral witnesses and so the ‘saved’ must ‘speak in their stead, by proxy’.69 Yet, and this 
is the locus of the ‘aporia of Auschwitz’ also voiced by Celan,70 the ‘drowned’, states 
Agamben, have nothing to report, no story, no voice and no thoughts, which means that 
‘whoever assumes the charge of bearing witness in their name knows that he or she must bear 
witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness.’71 This thought is echoed by 
‘Aschenglorie’, which, while using poetic language, articulates the failure of words in the face 
of what Derrida assumes to be the Holocaust.72 This is because the possibility of testifying has 
been, together with the actual witnesses, annihilated, as figured by the recurrent image of ash 
and the total consumption by fire it implies.73 Indeed, the poem’s final stanza could, according 
to Derrida, be understood as an affirmative statement regarding ‘the irreplaceability of the 
singular witness’74 or even, if interpreted as a proscription, forbidding altogether the act of 
witnessing for a witness,75 since testifying can only take place in the first person.76 And yet 
Celan’s recourse to poetics defies his poem’s gloomy message, suggesting that, in Derrida’s 
words, ‘all responsible witnessing engages a poetic experience of language’, whereby it 
potentially grants the poet a license to speak of the unspeakable.77 Haenel appears to share 
Derrida’s interpretation, for by replacing the pessimistic ‘No one’ with the questioning ‘Who’ 
he lightens its weight of, if not resolves, the conundrum the poem poses, consequently 
reopening the possibility of testifying to the Holocaust. That this was Heanel’s intention is 
corroborated by the novel’s paratext; in an interview the author asserts his duty as a writer to 
testify through ‘intuitive fiction’ for lack of other possibilities of writing about the Holocaust 
in the post-witness era:78 ‘[U]ne fiction scrupuleuse […] sera l’un des modes possibles de 
transmission de certaines vérités sur des sujets aussi difficiles que la Shoah. […] Il s’agit à ce 
moment-là d’aller jusqu’à l’irreprésentable, et c’est là que la littérature a un rôle à jouer.’79 To 
conclude this section, one could conceive of Haenel’s relation to Karski’s story as analogous 
to Derrida’s relationship to Celan’s writing, the French philosopher’s work being a counter-
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signature of the poet’s testimony to those killed. And, just as with his deconstruction of 
Celan’s poetry Derrida inscribes the Holocaust into Western philosophical tradition,80 Haenel, 
as we will see later, re-inscribes Karski’s feat into the history of not only World War II but 
also mankind, war for the novelist being a continuum rather than a period neatly terminated 
with peace treaties and the public punishment of culprits.  
Testimony Vs ‘historism’, or Jan Karski’s mission as a differend 
If Haenel’s re-presentation of Karski advocates the use of fiction in the face of the 
unlikelihood of fresh eyewitness accounts, his choice to speak in a witness’s stead 
paradoxically promotes the role of Holocaust testimony in historical inquiry and, by 
extension, implies the superiority of memory over History. Since the novel’s both self-
contradictory position and stance against conventional historiography can be regarded as a 
signature of the postmodern,81 one can reposition Jan Karski within the advent of testimony in 
the 1970s that coincides with, or perhaps even results from, the postmodern re-evaluation of 
individual experience and especially of the experience of those hitherto silenced and 
marginalised. 82 Also, as I will do in the remaining part of this article, one can reconsider 
Haenel’s novel in the light of the Lyotardian conception of ‘Auschwitz’ — a term the French 
philosopher uses metonymically — as a sublime event, that is as something that eludes both 
reason and representation and therefore requires historians to abandon their traditional critical 
apparatus and instead to take into account testimony and the underlying feeling. 
However puzzling this may sound, ever since the end of the war there has existed a bias 
against the use of survivors’ testimonies in writing about the Shoah, a bias which was 
particularly strong in the war’s immediate aftermath and which, even more surprisingly, was 
not restricted to the circle of historians. While Tony Kushner quotes names of early Holocaust 
historians, such as Léon Poliakov or Raul Hilberg, who favoured executioners’ against 
survivors’ testimonies, 83 Wieviorka speaks of the historian’s stupefaction before the suffering 
conveyed by the survivor’s story.84 Stone invokes in turn the scepticism of prominent 
Holocaust historian, Lucy Dawidowicz, or of Oulipien and Holocaust survivor Georges Perec 
who, despite his own traumatic experience of wartime loss, advocated historiography as 
                                                
80 I am indebted here to Gabrielle Hiltmann’s review of Derrida’s book which appeared in 2008 in the 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 39.2 (217-18) (p. 18). 
81 Hutcheon, 5. 
82 Wieviorka, ‘The Witness in History’, 391-92. 
83 Kushner, 277. 
84 Wieviorka, ‘The Witness in History’, 395-96. 
 16 
opposed to eyewitness accounts.85 In contrast to Dawidowicz’s or Perec’s position, Stone 
appears to collude with Jean-François Lyotard’s conception of ‘Auschwitz’ as a ‘differend’, 
which, as opposed to ‘litigation’, means that the ‘victim’ (as opposed to the ‘plaintiff’) has no 
means of proving the ‘wrong’ (as opposed to the ‘damage’) that s/he has suffered. Hence, 
although the ‘wrong’ is a priori inexpressible in the dominant idiom and/or according to the 
prevailing rules, the historian must somehow account for it, taking into consideration not only 
the testimony but also ‘mais ce qui reste du témoignage quand il est détruit […], le 
sentiment’.86 Evidently, the key terms here are ‘témoignage’ and ‘sentiment’, and indeed, 
following Lyotard, Stone founds his apology of eyewitness accounts on the fact that 
Holocaust memory is traumatic and thus obeying a different, that is non-linear temporality. 
Nor does trauma-affected memory dutifully rest in the past, incessantly engulfing the present 
with affect.87 Conversely, ‘historism’, as Stone calls a philosophy of history commanding that 
narratives conform to the rules of chronology, logic and resolution,88 tries to domesticate the 
trauma and insists on both the essential ‘pastness’ of the past89 and a sense of closure. The 
latter is achieved by imposing on Holocaust memory ‘the doctrine of salvation […] whether 
this comes in the shape of the liberation of the camps, the founding of the state of Israel or 
resettlement in America’.90 
Unlike Laurent Binet’s HHhH, which has been praised by one of Jan Karski’s critics 
for ending with a cathartic sense of closure, 91 Haenel’s novel breaks with the traditional 
pattern of popular cultural representations of the Holocaust, such as Spielberg’s Schindler’s 
List that follows the Christian model of conversion and redemption through rescue.92 Instead, 
Jan Karski proposes a view of history as an interminable circle of differends where the 
victims’ wrongs are never heard in a world operating according to the rules dictated by ‘the 
masters of humanity’, if one may extend the use of Karski’s designation of Roosevelt to the 
entire political establishment.93 One sign of Haenel’s refusal to impose on Karski’s story the 
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conventional narrative pattern used by historians and novelists alike, is his book’s 
composition that breaks with linearity instead privileging a reiterative model. The sense of 
closure is also denied through Haenel’s understanding of World War II, which, implicitly 
drawing on the concept of the ‘grey zone’, 94 flatly rejects the Manichean categories of 
‘perpetrators’ and ‘humanity’. Rather, by accusing the latter of the crime of non-assistance, it 
implicates us all in the execution of the Final Solution, and redefines the Holocaust as a crime 
committed by — rather than against — humanity. And so to the fictional Karski Yalta 
becomes a new Munich, while the Nuremberg Trials, which were supposed to offer some 
redemption to the victims’ families and a sense of closure, a cover-up for the Allies’ partial 
responsibility for the Holocaust. Finally, since 1945 saw the atomic bombings of Japan, it 
becomes ‘la pire année dans l’histoire du XXe siècle’ and not the year of triumph over 
fascism, liberation of German–occupied territories and reestablishment of peace.95 
 With its circular structure that undermines closure and fixity, Jan Karski also 
implicitly endorses Stone’s conception of the unusual temporality of Holocaust memory, 
which follows from its traumatic nature. The novel insists on the presentness of Karski’s past, 
which it communicates with a systematic (con)fusion of temporal levels. For example, in 
Parts I and II Haenel uses the present tense and emphasises Karski’s own use of the present 
during the interview, as well as his consequent ability to be transported back into the past by 
his words: ‘il parle au présent, il n’y a plus de distance avec ce qu’il décrit.’96 Moreover, the 
past and the present come together when, as mentioned earlier, Karski becomes one with the 
Jewish leaders; like the two men in 1942, it is now Lanzmann’s interviewee who is breaking 
down and losing control of himself, so that, unable to restrain his tears and sobs, he has to 
move out of the frame. How profoundly affected Haenel’s protagonist is by his experience 
also becomes evident in Part III where the fictional Karski spares us no details regarding his 
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body’s violent reaction to his past, including repeated bouts of nausea, chronic insomnia and 
melancholia.  
 Finally, Jan Karski reveals traditional historiography’s inadequacy when it comes to 
the Holocaust by presenting itself as a testimony to a differend, which in the novel is 
constituted not only by the combination of the Jews’ mass murder and their inability to voice 
their plight, and the Allies’ betrayal of the Poles, but also — if not chiefly — by Karski’s 
failure to deliver his message to Churchill and Roosevelt with the effect of stopping the 
Holocaust and saving Poland from being transferred to the Soviet zone of influence. The 
unspeakability of Karski’s highly traumatic experience is a running theme of Haenel’s novel 
that indeed derives its thrust, like so many texts about the Shoah, from its entanglement in the 
conflict between the impossibility and the imperative of testifying. In his summary of 
Lanzmann’s interview Haenel describes Karski’s sentences as ‘entourées de silence’, as 
bearing a trace of the difficulties the former Polish resister experienced when he moved out of 
the frame, and, oxymoronically, as ‘fidèles à l’impossibilité de parler.’97 The inability of 
language to describe what is beyond reason manifests itself again when Karski relates his visit 
to the ghetto. Full sentences give way to individual words, which are in turn punctuated by 
tears running down the witness’s face.  
Les phrases de Karski n’ont pas de souffle. Elles sont minuscules, un mot, deux mots, pas 
plus. […] Maintenant, le langage n’a plus de vie, il ne cherche plus à convaincre ni à 
expliquer, il ne pourra secourir personne. De pauvres visions s’accrochent à de pauvres 
mots: oignons, biscuits, yeux, seins. Ces mots-là ne sauvent pas.98 
The theme of the failure of language to save those who themselves have been brutally 
silenced returns in the much debated scene of the protagonist’s interview with Roosevelt. 
According to some, the scene violates the historical record by misrepresenting the American 
President as a simultaneously apathetic and lustful conformist, as well as Karski’s impression 
of him.99 Contrary to Golsan, for whom this episode of Haenel’s novel ‘borders on the 
ridiculous, or worse’,100 I argue that, despite the element of the grotesque, its overall tone is 
tragic. This is because Karski is figured here as a witness to a differend — a violence which 
had been done without witnesses and was covered up as much as possible so that it may not 
be represented. Furthermore, he too quickly finds himself in the position of a victim, for, as it 
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happened in London where Karski met with Anthony Eden, his message now falls on 
Roosevelt’s deaf ears. The incompatibility of the speaker’s and the listener’s idioms and the 
resulting impossibility of communicating the wrong of the Jews being murdered are conveyed 
here with a range of bi-polar oppositions, such as that between the absolute horror of the 
camps and ghettos, and the bourgeois comfort of Roosevelt’s office filled with plush sofas, 
porcelain tureens and elegant women. As the Jews are being refused their most basic rights 
before being indiscriminately sent to their death, the American President, comfortably seated 
in an armchair, stifling his yawns and eyeing up his secretary’s legs, is digesting his evidently 
copious dinner while building up his appetite for further pleasures. Roosevelt’s peaceful 
digestion is then opposed to Karski’s violent vomiting in the aftermath of his visit to the camp 
and to his subsequent recurrent nausea, which can be read as a sign of his body’s attempt to 
evacuate the abject constituted by the sight of a corpse, of countless corpses, of bodies 
between life and death and of children being murdered, which, to put it in Kristevan terms, 
with their disturbing inbetweenness threatened his position as a subject and sense of 
security.101  
Conclusions: Yannick Haenel as a witness to a differend? 
Continuing to structure my discussion with Lyotard’s rhetoric, in its remaining part I will 
comment upon Haenel’s relationship with Karski’s failed mission, which the author seems to 
model on his protagonist’s own relationship with Holocaust victims. In other words, by 
relating the Polish resister’s story, Haenel implicitly follows Lyotard’s recommendation that 
writers and philosophers identify and then bear witness to differends as a means of redressing 
the wrongs suffered by the victims.102 However, rather than using the dominant discourse to 
do so, whereby they would run the risk of doing the victims further injustice, they ought to 
‘romp[r]e avec le monopole consenti au régime cognitif des phrases sur l’histoire, et 
s’aventure[r] à prêter l’oreille à ce qui n’est pas présentable dans les règles de la 
connaissance’, so that the differend disclosed by the feeling may be expressed.103 By the same 
token, since Lyotard states that ‘Auschwitz’ abolished the possibility of the pronoun ‘we’, as 
the deportees were, on the one hand, surrounded by solitude and silence, and, on the other, 
forever excepted from the ‘we’ by their race, one must not attempt to occupy the victims’ 
position. If, rather than merely representing the differend, the writer/philosopher tries to speak 
in the victims’ stead or to offer a solution to the differend, s/he will merely misinterpret those 
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victims, do violence to the wrongs they have already suffered and make them victims once 
again.104 This is indeed the risk Haenel is taking in writing a text in which he patently 
identifies with his hero and, to the outrage of many critics, speaks on his behalf. Moreover, 
instead of limiting himself to meta-witnessing, as Lyotard recommends, Haenel tries to solve 
the differend by vociferously accusing humanity, and the Allies in particular, of letting down 
the Jews or even of quietly rejoicing in their disappearance from the face of the earth.105 One 
could argue therefore that, unable to respond to Haenel’s representation of him, Karski is once 
again victimised and that the novel does no more than replicate the violence the Polish hero 
suffered when his desperate plea met with no response.  
Yet, by shifting attention from Jan Karski’s thematics to its aesthetics, Haenel’s 
recognisably postmodern narrative technique may provide a counterargument to the afore-
stated charges. By adopting the traditional approach to telling the life-story of an actual 
person, which in this case would be biography with its reliance on documents and adherence 
to the principles of objectivity and veracity, Haenel would have to inscribe Karski’s life into a 
rhetoric that, as suggested earlier, accounts only for hard facts and not for feelings and thence 
cannot do justice to a differend. It would also inevitably impose on Karski’s story a dry-eyed, 
logical and chronological approach, thus, to take up Stone’s reflections, denying or 
domesticating the trauma, and/or ‘rendering it subject to a sense of finality’ and in the process 
of doing so ‘failing to respond to what is truly fearsome about trauma.’106 Moreover, writing a 
biography would oblige Haenel to accommodate Karski’s story to the metanarrative of the 
Allies’ moral superiority over the Germans, with the image of Nuremberg as the ultimate 
accomplishment of the free world’s triumph over fascist barbarity. This is because in his 
official pronouncements Karski, who wrote Story of the Secret State when there was still a 
glimmer of hope for saving the Poles from Stalin and the Jews from Hitler, and who broke his 
silence when the Cold War was already in full swing, largely maintained the predominant 
view of the United States as bastion of freedom, civil rights and democracy.  
Hence, though his ambition to resolve the differend and speak for his hero may be 
considered, whether viewed in Lyotard’s terms or otherwise, unethical, Haenel redeems 
himself by seeking a novel form and language for rendering Karski’s and, less directly, the 
Jews’ plight. In so doing he fulfils the task assigned by Lyotard to postmodern writers who 
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must be able to put ‘l’imprésentable dans la présentation elle-même; ce qui se refuse à la 
consolation des bonnes formes […], ce qui s’enquiert des présentations nouvelles […] pour 
mieux fait sentir qu’il y a de l’imprésentable’.107 Declaring a war on the idea of totality (le 
tout), mimesis and pre-established rules, the work of postmodern writers must not be 
evaluated by applying familiar categories or determinist judgment, since it creates its own 
rules and has the quality of a landmark event (l’événement).108 By creating a heterogeneous, 
fragmented and reiterative text that proclaims its double-coded nature as of its cover and then 
methodically refuses all generic classifications, Haenel evidently heeds Lyotard’s call on 
writers. Likewise, by bringing back into the spotlight Karski’s failure to save Europe’s Jews 
and the Polish hero’s later exploitation by Lanzmann, who first misled his interviewee about 
the nature of Shoah and then grossly misrepresented his mission by editing the interview,109 
the novelist follows the philosopher’s appeal to artists to become witnesses to all difference 
and differends,110 and thus save the honour of the written word (le nom).111 Additionally, 
Haenel voices the wrong done to Karski’s homeland, which despite its heroic resistance 
against the Germans was allowed by the Allies to slip under Stalin’s yoke. Then, having been 
the theatre of the Holocaust, Poland has often been erroneously lumbered with the 
responsibility for the Final Solution, while the Poles themselves have been stigmatised as 
virulent anti-Semites by, among others, one-sided representations such as Shoah.112 That 
Haenel himself believes in his ability as a writer to articulate — if not to undo — all the 
wrongs of the past to which his text testifies, transpires from the recurrent motif of the power 
of literature that, in order to merit its title, ought to seek to alter the course of history.113 The 
other sign of Haenel’s belief that his book can breathe life back into Karski is the theme of 
resurrection structuring his narrative and suggesting that, as Elie Wiesel reportedly said to the 
Polish courier, ‘[o]n peut redonner vie à la parole, par la parole.’114 And this is indeed what 
Haenel has managed to achieve even despite — or perhaps rather largely thanks to — the 
harsh criticism levelled at his book by Lanzmann, Wieviorka and others, while 
simultaneously asking important questions about Holocaust memory in the encroaching 
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absence of firsthand witnesses, and destabilising the dominant and perhaps all too simplistic 
understanding of the responsibility for the extermination of the Jews.  
